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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The Effects of Self-Construal and Religious Fundamentalism on  
 
Terror Management Mechanisms. (May 2004) 
 
Michael David Friedman, B.A., Washington University in St. Louis 
 
Chair of Advisory Committee:  Dr. W. Steve Rholes 
 
 
 
 Two experiments were conducted to assess the effects of self-construal and 
religious fundamentalism on terror management processes.  It was found that both 
interdependent self-construal and religious fundamentalist beliefs offer protection against 
death-related thoughts and worldview defense following mortality salience.  The 
implications for terror management theory are discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the 14 years since its introduction into the social psychological literature, 
Terror Management Theory (TMT; e.g. Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991) has 
been one of the more widely-investigated topics in the field, spawning over 150 
published journal articles and book chapters.  This theory is largely based on the works of 
cultural anthropologist Ernst Becker, who developed a broad theory of human motivation 
and behavior, based on the notion that the fear of physical death is a large motivator of 
quotidian cognition and action.  
Terror Management Theory, too, proposes that the underlying fear of physical 
death plays a significant role in everyday human thought and behavior.  According to 
TMT, human beings are unique in their ability to contemplate the fact that they are alive 
and that one day they will die. This knowledge is at odds with an instinctively-
programmed desire for self-preservation.  The combination of this drive for self-
preservation with the knowledge that ones life is finite has the potential to create 
paralyzing terror. 
Terror management theory posits that humans protect themselves from this terror 
by means of a dual-component cultural anxiety buffer.  This cultural anxiety buffer is 
comprised of two protective mechanisms:  the cultural worldview and self-esteem. 
Cultural worldviews are symbolic constructions that reduce the anxiety and terror  
 
surrounding death by providing a sense of order, meaning, permanence, standards of  
 
value, and the potential of literal and symbolic immortality to individuals lives.  People  
____________ 
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can attain a sense of symbolic immortality by identification with and adherence to a 
cultural worldview, which conveys a sense of belonging to an entity that will carry on 
long after ones personal death.  Religion can provide a sense of literal immortality by 
promising to reward the faithful with a never-ending afterlife.  Even when thoughts of 
death are not consciously present, people adhere to their cultural worldview because it 
provides protection from the continual unconscious fear of death that affects all humans.     
Self-esteem, within the framework of TMT, is viewed as ones belief in how well 
one meets the standards and requirements of the cultural worldview.  Self-esteem is thus 
a cultural construction that provides individuals with the sense that they are valuable 
members of a meaningful society.   
To be adequately protected from the threats continuously posed by the awareness 
of ones mortality, both components of the cultural anxiety buffer must be solid.  That is, 
one must have a relatively firm belief in ones cultural worldview and one must have 
sufficiently high self-esteem.  If either component is lacking, the protection provided by 
the cultural anxiety buffer will be inadequate.  In support of this notion, research has 
shown that depressed people (who often lack both a solid cultural worldview and high 
self-esteem) are prone to react more strongly than their non-depressed and high self-
esteem counterparts in typical terror management experiments (Simon et al., 1996; 
Simon, Arndt, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1998). 
Terror management research has focused on testing two basic hypotheses based 
on the theory. 
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Anxiety Buffer Hypothesis 
 The anxiety buffer hypothesis states that, if a psychological structure protects 
against anxiety, then bolstering that structure should reduce or eliminate anxiety and 
anxiety-produced behaviors in response to any number of threats.  Conversely, 
weakening the protective psychological structure should increase anxiety or anxiety-
produced behavior in response to threats.  Research has shown that induced and 
dispositionally high levels of self-esteem (Harmon-Jones et al., 1997) and the induced 
suggestion of an afterlife (Dechesne et al., 2003) all reduce death thought accessibility, 
worldview defense, and judgment of social transgressions, while induced and 
dispositionally low self-esteem, and the induced suggestion that there is no afterlife all 
increase these behaviors.  
Mortality Salience Hypothesis 
 The mortality salience hypothesis states that, if a psychological structure provides 
protection against the fear of death, then reminding individuals of their mortality should 
increase their reliance on that structure.  Research testing this hypothesis has shown that 
reminding individuals of their own mortality leads to a wide variety of behavioral and 
psychological outcomes, including (a) harsher criticism of foreigners who criticize the 
U.S., (e.g. Greenberg et al., 1992) (b) anxiety and discomfort when engaging in activities 
that violate cultural standards (Greenberg et al., 1995), and (c) self-esteem striving in 
personally relevant domains such as driving (Taubman, Florian & Mikulincer, 1999) and 
body image (Goldenberg et al., 2000).  Collectively, all of the studies examining the 
mortality salience hypothesis support the idea that reminders of death increase striving to 
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achieve self-esteem by validating the cultural worldview and defending against threats to 
ones self-esteem. 
The Effects Mortality Salience on Group Membership 
  Mortality salience has been shown to affect personal identification with groups. 
TMT theorists have speculated that groups are a powerful source of meaning, and thus 
they can provide protection from mortality concerns (Arndt et al., 2002).  Specifically, 
research on TMT has shown that, following mortality salience, individuals identify more 
closely with relevant in-groups.  For example, Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino, & Sacchi 
(2002) showed that mortality salience led Italian participants to identify more closely 
with their compatriots.  Furthermore, following mortality salience, Italians were more 
likely to see their nationality as having greater entitativity (i.e. they were more likely to 
see their abstract nationality as being more real and concrete than non-mortality salient 
participants). 
 In addition, identification with gender and ethnic group has been found to 
increase subsequent to mortality salience induction.  Arndt et al. (2002) found that, 
following mortality salience, women were more likely to perceive themselves as being 
similar to other women, and Hispanics were more likely to perceive themselves as being 
similar to other Hispanics (provided negative aspects of the ingroup were not salient- we 
will return to this issue in a moment). 
 However, there is evidence that the effects of mortality salience on group 
identification are not entirely straightforward.   
            In a study conducted in Holland, Dechesne, Jannsen, and van Knippenberg (2000) 
found that mortality salience lead to greater derogation of a critic of a relevant in-group 
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among high need-for-closure participants, but greater distancing from the in-group 
among low need-for-closure participants.  Simon et al. (1997) found that, among 
American participants, mortality salience lead to a greater striving for optimal 
distinctiveness- leading participants who were led to believe they were conformists to 
underestimate social consensus for their attitudes, and participants who were lead to 
believe they were social deviants to exaggerate social consensus for their attitudes.  In 
line with standard terror management theorizing, Arndt et al. (2002) found that womens 
identification with other women, and Hispanics psychological distancing from other 
Hispanics was dependent upon the salient valence of the in-group:  mortality salient 
women identified more with other women, except when negative gender stereotypes were 
salient, and mortality salient Hispanics engaged in more psychological distancing with 
other Hispanics when negative racial stereotypes were salient.  As Arndt et al. 
acknowledge, the anxiety buffering function of group identifications derives from the 
capacity of such identification to provide a sense that one is a valuable contributor to a 
meaningful reality (26). 
 Thus, the standard TMT position is that identification with groups provides the 
potential for increasing self-esteem, and so after MS, people identify more closely with 
groups in order to bolster their self-esteem.  In their recent book, Pyszczynski, Solomon, 
and Greenberg (2003) go so far as to state that although social connections are important 
means of terror management, their importance depends on their value for sustaining the 
individuals self-worth (91). 
 One recently published study, however, seems to contradict some of the thinking 
that posits self-esteem motivation as the primary drive behind enhanced identification 
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with groups following mortality salience.  Wisman and Koole (2003) showed that, 
following mortality salience, Dutch students were more willing to affiliate with others, 
even if the other individuals belonged to a worldview-threatening group, or if affiliation 
with others would require the participants to attack their own worldviews (which would, 
according to TMT, decrease ones self-esteem).  The authors postulate that affiliation 
concerns (the need to associate with others in times of duress) take precedence over self-
esteem concerns, at least in some circumstances, after mortality salience. 
Individualism and Collectivism, Conceptualized as Relating to Group Identification 
 Group membership can be understood to refer to membership in a particular 
group (e.g., a family, a university, a political party), or more abstractly to people in 
general.  One abstract conceptualization of group identification has been the much-
studied cultural dimension of individualism-collectivism (e.g. Markus & Kitayama, 
1991).  According to this approach, individualists see themselves as distinct entities, 
existing apart from and independently of other people.  Conversely, collectivists see 
themselves as more closely linked to other members of their society.   
 It is hypothesized that collectivists (Easterners), conceive of themselves (on 
average) as more connected with other members in their cultures.  Conversely, it is likely 
that individualists (Westerners), conceive of themselves (on average) as less connected 
with other members of their cultures (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).  If a sense of 
connection to others offers protection against mortality concerns, the nature of 
Easterners collectivist tendencies might provide protection against mortality salience, 
and the nature of Westerners individualist tendencies of the self might make these 
individuals more vulnerable to mortality concerns.  Furthermore, the fact that collectivist 
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cultural groups have been found to place greater emphasis on the strength of and 
deference given to relevant in-groups (Iyengar, Lepper, & Ross, 1999), seems to provide 
support for the notion that having collectivist tendencies might provide one with the 
sense of a more cohesive ingroup,  thus strengthening the cultural worldview component 
of the cultural anxiety buffer, reducing the effects of mortality salience.   
 It is important to understand that feeling connected does not necessarily mean that 
one is extraordinarily patriotic or nationalistic.  Rather, collectivism tends to be viewed as 
a general feeling of closeness to others, and as including other individuals in ones self-
concept.  Simply put, the closeness to others one would feel in a collectivist culture is a 
more general feeling of interconnectedness that is independent of patriotic or nationalistic 
tendencies.   
 On the basis of this conceptualization, it seems likely that that individualism and 
collectivism would be related to terror management practices.  However, though many 
terror management studies have been conducted in Western, individualistic countries-- 
the U.S., Israel (e.g. Taubman, Florian & Mikulincer, 1999), Germany (e.g. Pyszczynski 
et al., 1996), Canada (e.g. Baldwin & Wesley, 1996), and Holland (e.g. Dechesne, 
Janssen, & van Knippenbert, 2000)-- only two studies have examined the functioning of 
terror management within an Eastern culture (Heine, Harihara, & Niiya, 2002; Kashima, 
Halloran, Yuki, & Kashima (in press)).   
 The first study (Heine, Harihara, & Niiya, 2002), conducted in Japan, found 
mixed support for terror management within this cultural context.  Assessing only 
derogation of an anti-Japan essay, Heine and his colleagues found that mortality salient 
subjects viewed the anti-Japanese author more negatively than an author of a neutral 
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topic essay.  Strangely, this study did not assess evaluation of a pro-Japan author.  In the 
traditional terror management experiment, reactions to both pro and anti country essays 
are assessed (Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, 1997). Perhaps a pro-Japan essay was 
excluded because previous studies have shown that the Japanese are traditionally focused 
on negative, rather than positive, traits and outcomes (e.g. Kitayama, Markus, 
Matsumoto, & Norasakkunkit, 1997;  Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999).  
Regardless, it seems that one terror management result, the basic worldview defense 
finding, is replicable in collectivist cultures.  However, Heine et al.s experiment tested 
and failed to show increased preference for high-status products following mortality 
salience, a result that has been found in Western cultures (Mandel & Heine, 1999). 
 One other study has investigated terror management in an Eastern cultural 
context.  Kashima, Halloran, Yuki, and Kashima (in press) investigated terror 
management in Australians and Japanese.  The authors had two different mortality 
salience inductions- one focusing on the individuals death (personal mortality) and one 
on the death of the self and all of ones compatriots (collective mortality).  A control 
group which completed no death-related questions was also included.  The dependent 
measure of this study was the extent to which participants endorsed individualist values 
and behaviors following the experimental manipulation.  The results indicated that 
Australians endorsed items relevant to an autonomous self and individualist behavior 
more in the personal mortality condition than in the collective mortality condition.  The 
Australian control group endorsed these individualist-themed items less than both 
Australian mortality salient groups, suggesting that the effect of any mortality salience 
induction for Australians was associated with greater acceptance of individualism.  
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However, the Japanese decreased endorsement of items relevant to an autonomous self 
and individualist behavior more in the collective mortality condition than in the personal 
mortality condition.  The Japanese control group endorsed the individualist items more 
than did either mortality salient group, suggesting that the effect of any mortality salience 
manipulation for Japanese was associated with rejection of individualist values.  
However, this pattern emerged only for individuals low in self-esteem. 
            The results of these studies suggest that at least some of the effects of mortality 
salience are evident in one collectivist culture (Japan).  However, it is not clear whether 
the strength of the effect is the same, or whether other basic TMT findings would 
replicate to the same degree, if at all, in other collectivist nations.  More importantly, 
these studies were not designed to test the impact of individualistic and collectivistic 
tendencies on terror management mechanisms.  Because individualistic and collectivistic 
tendencies were not measured in these studies, we cannot conclude whether, at the level 
of the individual, individualism/collectivism impacts the functioning of terror 
management mechanisms.  It is clear that there is still much to be learned about the 
impact of collectivist tendencies on mortality salience. 
 It is possible to conceptualize two different processes which might take place 
when Easterners are confronted with thoughts about death.  The first possibility is that the 
inherent terror they feel will be the same as that which a Westerner would feel.  However, 
the built-in protective mechanism of their collectivistic tendencies would serve as a 
more effective buffer against such terror, and thus Easterners reactions to mortality 
salience would be less severe.  An alternative possibility is that Easterners inherent 
connections to others would serve as a blocking mechanism, which would prevent them 
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from feeling any terror in the first place.   However, given that Heine, Harihara, and 
Niiya (2002) and Kashima, Halloran, Yuki, and Kashima (in press) were able to replicate 
some terror management effects in Japan, this second explanation seems unlikely. 
 One of the inherent problems in all cross-cultural research is that there are likely 
to be a myriad of differences between and among any and all cultures under study (van de 
Vijver & Leung, 2000).  Often, it is often difficult to say just what component the given 
cultures is responsible for the observed differences in thought and behavior.  One 
promising method to examine these cultural differences is to perform a within culture 
investigation of the phenomena under study, enabling one to hold the cultural context 
stable, while manipulating the psychological construct hypothesized to account for the 
observed cross-cultural differences (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002). 
 At the level of the individual, the self-construal is the psychological construct 
hypothesized to account for many of the differences between individualists and 
collectivists.  Individualists are hypothesized to have independent self-consturals, seeing 
themselves as disconnected and different from others, while collectivists are 
hypothesized to have interdependent self-construals, seeing themselves as more closely 
connected to other people (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).   
 Several recent studies have successfully manipulated self-contruals of participants 
in both individualist and collectivist cultures (e.g. Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 1999).  The 
following experiments capitalize on this method, holding cultural context stable, while 
manipulating independent and interdependent self-construals of American participants.   
 There are several validated experimental techniques for manipulating independent 
and interdependent self-construals.  The first consists of a priming technique pioneered 
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by Trafimow and his colleagues (Trafimow et al., 1991).  In this technique, participants 
read a short passage describing a general who makes a decision to send a warrior to his 
king.  In the independent version, the general chooses the warrior based on the warriors 
individual attributes.  In the interdependent version, the general chooses a member of his 
own family, out of familial duty.   
 A second technique, also developed by Trafimow and colleagues (Trafimow et 
al., 1991), involves having participants contemplate the ways they are different from their 
family and friends (independent priming), or their similarity with their family and friends 
(interdependent priming).  The final empirically validated technique to manipulate self-
construal was first employed by Brewer and Gardner (Brewer & Gardner, 1996).  
Participants complete a word search task, in which they circle all of the pronouns 
contained in a short passage.  In the independent condition, the pronouns are focused on 
independence (e.g. I, mine), while in the interdependent condition, the pronouns 
emphasize interdependence (e.g. we, ours).   
How does the self-construal priming affect cognition and behavior?  To explain 
the effects of self-construal priming, Kuhnen, Hannover, & Schubert (2001) propose a 
semantic-procedural interface (SPI) model of the self.  In this approach, ones self-
knowledge (independent or interdependent) is linked with ones corresponding mode 
(context independent or dependent) of contextual thinking.  Independent self-knowledge 
is linked to a context independent mode of thinking, and interdependent self-knowledge 
is linked to a context dependent mode of thinking.  The link between self-knowledge 
contextual modes of thinking is hypothesized to stem from the cognitive efforts used to 
create independent or independent self-construals.  Specifically, independent self-
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knowledge is gleaned from combining self-descriptive traits across a wide variety of 
social contexts, which requires one to ignore social context in favor of internal attributes.  
Conversely, interdependent knowledge is gleaned from social interactions in specific 
contexts with certain individuals; the acquisition of this knowledge requires careful 
attention to ones context and ones partners in the given social interaction.  Thus, 
semantically priming independent self-knowledge should activate a context-independent 
cognitive processing style, while semantically priming interdependent self-knowledge 
should activate a context-dependent cognitive processing style.  As outlined below, this 
contention has received a great deal of empirical support. 
The effects of self-construal priming have been demonstrated on a wide variety of 
experimental tasks.  Research has shown that independent (interdependent) self-construal 
manipulation affects participants preferences for independent (interdependent) values, 
internal (external) attributions (Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 1999), context independent 
(dependent) cognitive processing in visual search tasks (Kuhnen & Oyserman, 2001; 
Kuhnen, Hannover & Schubert, 2001), and context independent (dependent) processing 
of conversational norms (evidenced by participants taking their recipients prior 
knowledge into account when answering questions after interdependent priming, but not 
after independent priming) (Haberstroh et al., 2002).  Finally, both chronic and 
experimentally manipulated independent self-construals have been shown to increase the 
tendency to emphasize promotion-focused information, while chronic and experimentally 
manipulated interdependent self-construals have been shown to increase the tendency to 
emphasize prevention-focused information (Lee, Gardner, & Aaker, 2000).   
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Furthermore, when experiments have simultaneously conducted within-culture 
examinations of self-construal manipulations along with cross-cultural comparisons of 
participants from individualist and collectivist cultures, the within-culture priming has 
been shown to elicit collectivist responses from individualists primed with interdependent 
self-construals, and to elicit individualistic responses from collectivists primed with 
independent self-construals (Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 1999; Lee, Gardner, & Aaker, 
2000; Haberstroh et al., 2002).  Even in the self-construal priming studies that have not 
conducted simultaneous cross-cultural replications, the results obtained with subjects who 
receive self-construal priming mirror observed cultural differences between members of 
individualist and collectivist cultures.  For example, both unprimed individuals in 
collectivist cultures (e.g. Japan, Malaysia, Russia) and individuals in individualist 
cultures who receive an independent prime show more context dependency in a variety of 
experimental tasks (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001; Kuhnen et al., 2001; 
Kitayama, Duffy, Kawamura, & Larsen, 2003). 
It is important to note that our approach takes a slight theoretical divergence from 
the standard terror management position.  While other theorists (e.g. Arndt et al., 2002; 
Pyszczynski, Solomon, and Greenberg, 2003) have contended that the most important 
aspect of protection-providing groups is the extent to which a group is positively viewed 
and can thus aid one's self-esteem, we suggest something different.  In our view, the 
anxiety provoked by mortality salience is so jarring to one's conception of the world, that 
the heightened sense of connection with (non-specific) others provided by an enhanced 
interdependent self-construal identification is sufficient to protect against mortality 
concerns.  The fact that self-esteem is important to Western individuals has been well-
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established, but equally well-established is the notion that Eastern individuals do not 
place nearly as much value on the importance of bolstering and maintaining self-esteem 
(see Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999 for a thorough review).  Given that self-
construal priming has been shown to elicit typically Eastern cognitions and behaviors 
from Western individuals, it is entirely possible that the increased connection to others 
provided by self-construal manipulation in Western subjects can protect against mortality 
salience effects, irrespective of the potential for self-esteem enhancement provided by 
identification with a specific group.  
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RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM:  AN IMPORTANT PIECE OF THE 
PUZZLE 
 As terror management deals explicitly with the inevitability of death (and 
consequently, and end to life), a discussion of religious worldviews that promise their 
believers eternal life is extremely relevant to terror management theory.  In the context of 
these studies, I will discuss the impact of religious fundamentalism on terror management 
mechanisms. 
 I take my operational definition of this variable from Altemeyer and Hunsberger 
(1992), who define religious fundamentalism as: 
the belief that there is one set of religious teachings that clearly contains the 
fundamental, basic, intrinsic, essential, inerrant truth about humanity and deity; 
that this essential truth is fundamentally opposed by forces of evil which must be 
vigorously fought; that this truth must be followed today according to the 
fundamental, unchangeable practices of the past; and that those who believe and 
follow these fundamental teachings have a special relationship with the deity 
(118). 
 
 One of the benefits of this definition is that it does not necessarily focus 
exclusively on Christianity.  Though I suspect that my sample will be primarily Christian, 
I believe that the critical aspects of religious fundamentalism for this project (which I will 
discuss shortly) do not necessitate a Christian worldview, merely a fundamentalist one. 
 To measure religious fundamentalism, I will use the Religious Fundamentalism 
Scale (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992), a 20-item scale with high reliability (αs in the 
1992 article ranged from .92 to .95, inter-item correlations ranged between .38 and .48). 
 This scale has been shown to correlate reliably with authoritarianism and attitudes 
towards homosexuality in Christian (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992) as well as Muslim, 
Hindu, and Jewish religious fundamentalists (Hunsberger, 1996).  Thus, available 
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evidence suggests that the scale can be used reliably to measure religious fundamentalism 
for individuals of many different faiths.    
Previous Psychological Investigations of Terror Management and Religion 
 So far, only one published study (Burling, 1993) has investigated terror 
management and religion.  In this study, participants were made aware of their mortality, 
and subsequently their religiosity was examined.  The study revealed no main effects of 
mortality salience; thinking about death did not increase ones self-reported level of 
religiosity. 
 There has been some other investigation of terror management and religion, but 
so far this work has not been published. 
 The first unpublished study on terror management and religious fundamentalism 
was Casebolts (1994) dissertation on terror management and attributional derogation of 
AIDS victims.  Casebolt found that high religious fundamentalists made more 
attributional derogations (by attributing AIDS more to internal-stable causes) of 
homosexual AIDS victims only when their mortality had been made salient. 
 Ara Norenzayan has conducted several (currently unpublished) studies using 
religion and religious beliefs as a dependent measure.  The results of the first two studies 
showed that, following mortality salience, participants were more likely to report that 
they were religious and believed in God.   In studies 3 and 4, mortality salient participants 
were more likely to endorse the idea that Buddha can answer prayers, and that Siberian 
Shaman ancestral spirits exist, although the latter effect was only found among 
participants who were religious.  In sum, this research suggests that, following mortality 
salience, people might be more likely to believe in any supernatural entity.  However, the 
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fact that this effect emerged only for religious participants in one of Norenzayans 
studies, coupled with the fact that Burling (1993) found no effect of mortality salience on 
self-reported religiosity, suggests that the effect of mortality salience on self-reported 
religiosity is not yet fully understood. 
Religious Fundamentalism and Terror Management 
 Pyszczynski, Solomon, and Greenberg (2003) state that fundamentalism, which 
they define as the belief that one religion contains the absolute literal truth about life, 
might be helpful (and perhaps necessary) for individuals to reap psychological benefits 
from religion.  The authors conclude that, the safest, most secure system is probably one 
with rigid, narrow, unquestioned beliefs that include a concrete depiction of the afterlife.  
This is the type of worldview that until the age of Darwin was prevalent in all cultures 
(197) and that millions of people are still tucked securely into such belief systems 
(197).   It is my contention that religious fundamentalists hold such worldviews, and are 
protected from death concerns by these views. 
 Pargament (2002), in a review of the psychological implications of religiousness, 
takes a similar stance.  Religious fundamentalism, he points out, provides many 
advantages to people who hold such beliefs.  Religious fundamentalists have an 
unambiguous sense of right and wrong, clear rules for living, closeness with like-minded 
believers [and] the faith that their lives are sanctioned and supported by God (172).   
The implications for terror management mechanisms are obvious.  As Pargament writes, 
this unambiguous, straightforward worldview may be especially valuable to individuals 
in search of clear-cut answers to existential questions (173). 
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 If religious fundamentalism provides individuals with an unambiguous, death-
transcending worldview, then it is possible that they might not be as vulnerable to terror 
management effects.  As will be discussed below, I will empirically assess this 
proposition as part of my thesis. 
 Thus, my masters thesis will investigate both the effects of self-construal 
manipulation and the effects of religious fundamentalism on terror management effects.   
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HYPOTHESES 
I hypothesize that participants who are high in religious fundamentalism will 
show comparable death-thought accessibility regardless of whether they receive an 
interdependent or independent self-construal prime.   
Whether the high religious fundamentalists will show greater or less death-
thought accessibility is a question that is theoretically interesting, but difficult to make 
specific a priori predictions about.  If high religious fundamentalists have completely 
solved the problem of their impending mortality, then one might expect to see any level 
of death-thought accessibility, because death would not be a problem for them.  However, 
if high religious fundamentalists use their religion as protection against death concerns, 
then one would expect them to show relatively low death-thought accessibility overall, 
because death is still problematic to them, but their defenses are strong and ample.  
Regardless of which process takes place, one would expect high religious fundamentalists 
to complete equal numbers of death-related words in both priming conditions. 
I hypothesize that participants who are low in religious fundamentalism and are 
exposed to an interdependent self-construal prime will show reduced death awareness 
(i.e. have the concept of death less cognitively available), compared to mortality salient 
control groups who receive the independent self-construal priming.   
I hypothesize that participants high in religious fundamentalism will not be as 
strongly motivated to bolster their cultural worldview following mortality salience.  
Specifically, when evaluating letters to the editor (taken from the Battalion) which 
espouse moderately positive and negative opinions of A&M traditions, mortality salient 
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participants who have high levels of religious fundamentalism will show attenuated (or 
no) pro A&M tradition bias, compared to mortality salient participants who have low 
levels of religious fundamentalism.   
I hypothesize that participants who are low in religious fundamentalism will show 
the typical terror management effect; after thinking about their own death, they will show 
more pro-A&M tradition bias than after thinking about dental pain. 
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STUDY ONE 
Method 
The aim of this first experiment was to investigate the effects of 
independent/interdependent self-construal manipulation on death-thought accessibility.  
There were two levels of self-construal priming: independent and interdependent.  The 
method for this priming consisted of reading a short paragraph and circling either 20 
independent (I, me, mine) or interdependent (we, our, ourselves) pronouns contained 
therein (Brewer & Gardner, 1996).  As described earlier, there are numerous ways to 
manipulate self-construal.  Because no method has any clear advantage over the others, I 
chose the above method because it is easy to administer and simple to verify that the 
participants have actually completed the task (one can count how many pronouns each 
participant circles).   
Following the self-construal manipulation, participants completed a task that 
measured the extent to which death-related concepts were cognitively accessible to them 
(Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Simon, & Breus, 1994).  This was done by means of 
a word completion task which lists 26 word fragments, (e.g. PLA _ _ ).  Each 
participant filled in the blanks to create words.  Eight of the 26 fragments can be 
completed with death-related words.  For example, the fragment DE _ _ can be 
completed with the word dead or deer.   
Subsequent to the dependent measure, participants completed the State Self-
Esteem Scale (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991), the Rosenberg (1965) Self-Esteem Scale, and 
the Religious Fundamentalism Scale (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992).  I did not 
anticipate any differences in self-esteem between conditions.  However, given the 
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importance of self-esteem in Terror Management Theory, having this data allowed us to 
rule out a compelling alternative explanation for our results.  
I hypothesized that participants who are high in religious fundamentalism would 
show similar levels of death-thought accessibility in both priming conditions.  For the 
reasons mentioned above, I made no specific predictions regarding the number of death 
related words these participants would complete. 
I hypothesized that, for participants low in religious fundamentalism, individuals 
who received the interdependent self-construal manipulation would show reduced death-
thought accessibility (e.g. complete fewer of the fragments with death-related words) 
than participants who received the independent self-construal manipulation. 
Participants 
 Ninety three participants (26 male and 66 female, one did not report gender) were 
recruited from the PSYC 107 subject pool.  Participants received partial course credit for 
their participation Forty three participants received the independent prime, and 47 
participants received the interdependent prime. 
 Twelve subjects were excluded from the analysis because they circled less than 17 
(out of 20) pronouns, suggesting that they did not receive the full extent of the prime 
(indeed, some participants neglected to circle any pronouns- indicating they did not take 
the experiment seriously).  Including these subjects in the analyses did not significantly 
change the results; all the analyses reported below remained significant with all 
participants included. 
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Scale Reliability 
 All of the scales used in the study showed acceptable reliability.  Cronbachs 
alphas were as follows:  Religious Fundamentalism Scale- .92, State Self-Esteem Scale- 
.88, Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale- .82. 
Grouping Participants by Religious Fundamentalism Scores  
 To group participants into high and low religious fundamentalist groups, a median 
split was conducted on the religious fundamentalism measure.  The median score on the 
measure was 106, out of 180 possible points, and the scores on the measure were 
normally distributed.  All participants scoring below the median were classified as low 
religious fundamentalists, while all participants scoring above the median were classified 
as high religious fundamentalists.  Using this method, 40 participants were classified as 
low religious fundamentalists, while 37 were classified as high religious fundamentalists. 
Word Completion Task 
 The number of death-related words completed was subjected to a 2 
(interdependent vs. independent prime) X 2 (high vs. low religious fundamentalism) 
ANOVA.  The results indicated no main effects for either self-construal, F (1, 77) = 1.21, 
p = .28 or religious fundamentalism, F (1, 77) = 1.33, p = .25.  However, the condition X 
religious fundamentalism interaction was highly significant, F (1, 77) = 11.30, p = .001. 
Planned comparisons revealed that the low religious fundamentalist group 
completed fewer death-related words (M = 2.22) following the interdependent prime than 
following the independent prime (M = 3.18), t (38) = 2.60, p = .013 (two-tailed). 
 However, there was no significant difference in the number of death-related 
words completed by high religious fundamentalist participants based on self-construal (M 
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= 2.76 for the interdependent prime, M = 2.35 for the independent priming), t (36) = -
1.03, p = .31 (two-tailed). 
 These results suggest that, as predicted, interdependent self-construal can protect 
against mortality concerns, at least for low religious fundamentalist participants.  For 
high religious fundamentalist participants, no significant difference emerged between 
participants primed with either interdependent or independent self-construals. 
Self-Esteem Measures 
 Perhaps these results are caused by differences in self-esteem.  Given that high 
religious fundamentalists are securely embedded in a worldview that provides inherent 
protection against mortality concerns, it is conceivable that they could have higher 
chronic or state self-esteem.  As high self esteem has been shown to protect against 
mortality concerns (Harmon-Jones et al., 1997), it is possible that increased self-esteem 
could have been the cause of the generally low numbers of death-related words 
completed by the high religious fundamentalist participants. 
 Another possibility is that the interdependent self-construal resulted in increased 
self-esteem for the low religious fundamentalist participants.  If the inherent feeling of 
closeness is comforting to people, it is possible that this closeness caused an increase in 
self-esteem, and it is the increased self-esteem that accounted for the lower numbers of 
death-related words completed.  Along the same lines, if the inherent feeling of 
separateness engendered by the independent prime is discomforting at some level, it is 
possible that this resulted in lower self-esteem, and that the lowered self-esteem in turn 
resulted in higher numbers of death-related words completed. 
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 To test these alternative explanations, two 2 (interdependent vs. independent 
prime) X 2 (high vs. low religious fundamentalism) ANOVAs were computed, using the 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale and the State Self-Esteem Scales as dependent variables. 
 For the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, there was no effect of self-construal, F (1, 
77) = 1.78, p = .19, religious fundamentalism, F (1, 77) = .29, p = .60, or the interaction 
between the two, F (1, 77) = .01, p = .92 on the measure of chronic self-esteem.  Thus, 
there were no differences in chronic self-esteem based on either prime or level of 
religious fundamentalism, suggesting that the observed differences in the number of 
death-related words was not due to this variable. 
 For the State Self-Esteem Scale, there was no effect of self-construal, F (1, 77) = 
.11, p = .74, religious fundamentalism, F (1, 77) = .002, p = .97, or the interaction 
between the two, F (1, 77) = .002, p = .96.  Thus, differences in state self-esteem likely 
did not cause the differences in the number of death-related words completed in this 
study. 
Analysis of Religious Fundamentalism Measure 
 Because the religious fundamentalism measure is so critical to the results of this 
study, and because this measure was collected after the priming (though well-after- 
participants completed three other tasks before completing this measure), I thought it 
prudent to ensure that there were no differences on this measure based on self-construal 
prime. 
 A one-way ANOVA was computed, using self-construal as the independent 
variable, and religious fundamentalism as the dependent variable.  The results indicated 
that there was no effect of condition F (1, 77) = .51, p = .48 on the religious 
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fundamentalism measure.  Thus, I feel confident that this measure was not at all biased 
by the experimental manipulation. 
Discussion 
 The major hypothesis of this study, that interdependent self-construal would 
reduce death-thought accessibility, was supported.  Moreover, this finding was not due to 
the effect of the self-construal prime on self-esteem. 
 The finding that self-construal did not affect state or chronic measures of self-
esteem could be seen as surprising in some theoretical frameworks.  For example, the 
both terror management theory and the Markus & Kitayama framework would suggest 
that priming Western individuals with independent self-construal would increase their 
self-esteem.  In both of these frameworks, living up to the cultural ideal (individualism, 
in Western contexts) should promote and foster positive feelings about the self.  
However, in the current study, this was not observed. 
 Thus, the results of this study diverge from typical terror management theorizing 
in that connectedness to non-specific others (interdependent self-construal) was shown to 
provide protection from death awareness, regardless of observed self-esteem or the 
potential for self-esteem enhancement of a given ingroup.  
 However, the evidence that religious fundamentalism can protect against 
mortality concerns was not especially empirically strong in this study.  The obtained 
values for the number of death-related words completed by the high religious 
fundamentalist participants in both priming conditions were in between those of the low 
religious fundamentalists primed with interdependent and independent self-construals.  
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Thus, a second study was conducted to more rigorously test the hypothesis that religious 
fundamentalism can protect individuals from standard terror management effects. 
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STUDY TWO 
Method 
The second experiment was designed to investigate the impact of religious 
fundamentalism on worldview defense.  Participants were asked two open ended 
questions; half answered two questions about dental pain, and half answered two 
questions about their own death (e.g. Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & 
Lyon, 1989). 
The open-ended questions that follow were presented as part of a "projective 
personality test:"   
-Please briefly describe the emotions that the thoughts of your own death arouses 
in you. 
-Jot down, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you as you 
physically die and once you are physically dead. 
The dental pain manipulation followed the same format, with "dental pain" 
replacing the death related words in the questions. 
As a filler task after the mortality salience manipulation, subjects completed the 
PANAS (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), in order to assess their mood states.   
Subjects then completed three distracter tasks, because distal terror management 
effects like those used in this study have been shown to be greatest when there is a delay 
period between the MS induction and the dependent measure (e.g. Greenberg, Arndt, 
Simon, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 2000).   
Subjects then completed the dependent measure that consisted of two essays taken 
almost directly from the editorial page of the Battalion.  One essay takes a moderately 
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positive view towards an A&M tradition (specifically, the tradition of removing ones hat 
during a yell at A&M football games), and one takes a moderately negative view towards 
the same tradition.  Order of presentation was counterbalanced across subjects. 
Following the essay evaluation, participants completed the Religious 
Fundamentalism Scale (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992) and a brief demographic 
questionnaire.   
Worldview defense was evaluated by subtracting the subjects opinions of the 
anti-tradition essay and author from the subjects opinions of the pro-tradition essay and 
author.   
I hypothesized that highly religiously fundamentalist participants would show 
comparable levels of worldview defense in both the dental pain and the mortality salience 
conditions.  In other words, the mortality salience manipulation should have no effect on 
the ratings of individuals high in religious fundamentalism.   
However, I hypothesized that the low religious fundamentalist participants would 
show the traditional terror management pattern of worldview defense following mortality 
salience.  I predicted that these participants would show more pro-worldview bias in the 
mortality salience condition than in the dental pain condition. 
Participants 
 One hundred twenty one participants (77 females and 44 males) were recruited 
from the PSYC 107 subject pool.  Participants received partial course credit for their 
participation.  Sixty two participants were in the dental salience condition, while 57 were 
in the mortality salience condition. 
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Scale Reliability 
 All of the scales in this study showed acceptable reliability.  Per standard terror 
management studies, the first three items of the essay evaluations (how much do you like 
this person, how intelligent did you think this person was, and how knowledgeable did 
you think this person was) were summed together to create an index of person evaluation.  
Cronbachs alphas for the pro and anti-tradition essays were .84 and .81, respectively.  
The fourth and fifth items of the essay evaluations (how much did you agree with this 
persons opinions, from your perspective, how true do you think this persons opinions 
are) were summed together to create an index of opinion evaluation.  Cronbachs alphas 
for these scales for the pro and anti-tradition essays were .89 and .83, respectively. 
 Cronbachs alphas for the religious fundamentalism scale and the PANAS were 
.91 and .87, respectively. 
Grouping Participants by Religious Fundamentalism Scores  
 To group participants into high and low religious fundamentalist groups, a median 
split was conducted on the religious fundamentalism measure.  The median score on the 
measure was 106.5, almost identical to the first study, suggesting that the level of 
religious fundamentalism did not differ between the two studies.  As in the first study, all 
participants scoring below the median were classified as low religious fundamentalists, 
while all participants scoring above the median were classified as high religious 
fundamentalists.  Using this method, 59 participants were classified as low religious 
fundamentalists, while 60 were classified as high religious fundamentalists. 
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Essay Evaluation 
 The total score of each individuals anti-tradition person evaluation was 
subtracted from his or her pro-tradition person evaluation, to create an index of pro-
tradition bias in the person evaluation.  Similarly, the total score of each individuals anti-
tradition opinion evaluation was subtracted from his or her pro-tradition opinion 
evaluation to create an index of pro-tradition bias in the opinion evaluation. 
 The person and bias scores were each submitted to a 2 (dental vs. mortality 
salience) X 2 (high versus low religious fundamentalism) X 2 (male vs. female) 
ANOVA. 
Person Evaluation 
 For the person evaluation, there were no significant main effects of mortality 
salience, F (1, 119) = .47, p = .49, religious fundamentalism, F (1, 119) = .87, p = .35, or 
sex, F (1, 119) = .85, p = .35.  In addition, the following two-way interactions were not 
statistically significant:  religious fundamentalism by sex, F (1, 119) = .002, p = .96, or 
mortality salience by sex, F (1, 119) = .17, p = .68. 
 However, the two-way interaction between mortality salience and religious 
fundamentalism on the person evaluations was marginally significant, F (1, 119) = 3.09, 
p = .08.  The pattern of means was consistent with my predictions; low religious 
fundamentalists showed much more bias in the mortality salience condition (M = .46) 
than in the dental pain condition (M = -1.97).  However, the person bias means for the 
high religious fundamentalists were very close to each other; means for the bias scores in 
the mortality and dental pain conditions were .38 and .48, respectively. 
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 The three-way interaction among religious fundamentalism, mortality salience, 
and sex was significant, F (1, 119) = 4.967, p = .028. 
 Planned comparisons revealed that low religious fundamentalist males showed 
greater person bias in the MS condition (M = 1.08) than the dental pain condition (M =    
-3.92), t (22) = -2.12, p = .045 (two-tailed).  However, high religious fundamentalist 
males showed no greater bias in the MS condition (M = -2.56) than in the dental pain 
condition (M = 1.8), t (17) = 1.63, p = .12 (two-tailed). 
 For the women, there was no difference between conditions for the low religious 
fundamentalist women, M = -.74 in the dental condition and M = 0.00 in the MS 
condition, t (33) = -.46, p = .65 (two-tailed).  Nor was there a significant difference 
between the person bias scores for the high religious fundamentalism women, M = -.14 in 
the dental pain condition, M = 1.7 in the MS condition, t (39) = -.81, p =.43 (two-tailed). 
 Thus, the overall pattern of results was consistent with my hypotheses.  For the 
males (but not the females), my hypotheses were supported by statistically significant 
results.  To me, this is not problematic.  Even in many published TMT experiments, the 
person evaluation does not always differ between the MS and control conditions (e.g. 
Greenberg et al., 1994).  Furthermore, my study differs from the typical terror 
management experiments in a very important way:  in this study both essay writers are 
in-group members (A&M students).  Most other studies use essays supposedly written by 
foreign students.   
Given that women have been shown to be more attuned to interpersonal concerns 
(e.g. Cross & Madson, 1997), it is possible that they would be less likely to overtly 
denigrate an in-group member, even following MS. 
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Moreover, from the perspective of TMT, the opinion measure (representing a 
relevant cultural worldview) is the more theoretically critical one.   
Opinion Evaluation 
 The analysis of the opinion bias index revealed no main effects of mortality 
salience F (1, 119) = .67, p = .42, religious fundamentalism F (1, 119) = .01, p =.92, or 
sex F (1, 119) = .67, p = .42. 
 However, as predicted, the religious fundamentalism by mortality salience 
interaction was significant, F (1, 119) = 4.04, p = .047.  Neither of the other two-way 
interactions were significant:  religious fundamentalism by sex F (1, 119) = 1.00, p = .32, 
mortality salience by sex F (1, 119) = .03, p = .87, nor was the three-way religious 
fundamentalism by mortality salience by sex interaction F (1, 119) = 2.17, p = .14. 
 Planned comparisons revealed that, among low religious fundamentalist 
participants, the predicted (and traditional) terror management effect was found, t (58) =  
-2.189, p = .033 (two-tailed).  Low religious fundamentalist participants in the MS 
condition evidenced more opinion bias (M = 1.39) than low religious fundamentalist 
participants in the dental pain condition (M = -2.28). 
 It is interesting to note that the MS treatment changed the overall valence of the 
opinion bias score for low religious fundamentalist participants.  Under normal 
conditions, low religious fundamentalists took a relatively unfavorable view towards 
upholding all A&M traditions, evidenced by their negative bias score (-2.28) in the dental 
pain condition.  However, when their mortality as made salient, low religious 
fundamentalist participants held favorable views towards upholding all A&M traditions, 
as evidenced by their positive bias score (1.39) in the MS condition.  
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 However, as predicted, high religious fundamentalist participants evidenced no 
more bias in the MS condition (M = -.86) than high religious fundamentalist participants 
in the dental pain condition (M = -.06), t (58) = .41, p = .69 (two-tailed).  Thus, high 
religious fundamentalist participants were not affected by the MS manipulation. 
PANAS 
 To determine whether mood was affected by the experimental manipulation, 
religious fundamentalism, or sex, I conducted 2 (mortality vs. dental salience) X 2 (high 
vs. low religious fundamentalism) X 2 (male vs. female) ANOVAs, using the positive 
and negative mood state subscales of the PANAS as dependent variables. 
 The results indicated that negative mood was not impacted by mortality salience F 
(1, 119) = .421, p = .625, religious fundamentalism F (1, 119) = .485, p = .488, or sex F 
(1, 119) = .569, p = 452.  For the negative mood subscale, none of the two or three way 
interactions were significant, all Fs < 1.3, all ps > .6. 
 However, the analysis of positive mood state revealed a significant main effect of 
religious fundamentalism, F (1, 119) = 6.339, p = .013.  None of the other main effects or 
interactions was significant, all Fs < 3, all ps > .05.  An examination of the positive 
mood scores showed that high religious fundamentalists had more positive moods (M = 
29.2) than low religious fundamentalists (M = 25.53).   
 To assure that positive affect was not mediating the relationship between religious 
fundamentalism and the attenuated person and opinion evaluations for the high RF group, 
I computed correlations between the raw religious fundamentalism scores, sex, positive 
affect scores, and the pro-tradition person and opinion bias scores.  If the positive affect 
scores were correlated with the pro-tradition bias indices, then analyses could be 
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conducted to test for mediation.  However, positive affect was not significantly correlated 
with either the person or opinion bias scores.  Thus, the data do not indicate that the 
attenuated pro-tradition bias of the high religious fundamentalists in the mortality 
salience condition was mediated by their overall greater positive affect.   
Coding of the Mortality Salient Condition Essays 
 To examine the possible differences in the open-ended death essays written by 
high and low religious fundamentalists, two different sets of analyses were conducted.   
 The first analysis involved the number of religious-themed words found in the 
essays (e.g. Jesus, heaven, faith, etc.).  I took photocopies of all of the death essays, and 
without knowing what group (high or low fundamentalist) the author was in, I counted all 
of the religious-themed words in each essay, and submitted this to a one-way ANOVA, 
with religious fundamentalism (high vs. low) as the dependent variable.  The results 
indicated a significant effect of religious fundamentalism, F (1, 56) = 6.05, p = .02.  High 
religious fundamentalists included an average of 2.41 religious-themed words in their 
essays, while low religious fundamentalists included an average of 1.29 religious-themed 
words in their essays.  Moreover, a one-way ANOVA revealed that the total number of 
words written in the essays did not differ between high and low religious fundamentalists, 
F (1, 57) = 2.51, p = .12.  In fact, low religious fundamentalists wrote on average more 
words (M = 76.57) in the essays than their high religious fundamentalist counterparts (M 
= 56.62).  Thus, the larger number of religious-themed words in the high religious 
fundamentalists essays was not due to their writing longer essays in general. 
 The second set of analyses involved more subjective coding of the essays.  After 
first agreeing on a coding scheme, five independent coders rated each essay, using 9-
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point Likert scales, on the following dimensions:  peacefulness, acceptance, calmness, 
positive affect, anxiousness, scared, uncertainty, sadness, and negative affect.  Coders 
were blind to the group each participant was in (high vs. low religious fundamentalism). 
 Inter-rater reliability coefficients (αs) for the ratings were acceptably high.  The 
inter-rater reliability coefficients for the dimensions are as follows:  peacefulness- .84, 
acceptance- .90, calmness-.87, positive affect- .85, anxiousness -.89, scared- .97, 
uncertainty- .86, sadness-.92, and negative affect- .90.    
 The codings of each rater were summed together, and each composite score was 
subjected to a 2 (high vs. low religious fundamentalism) X 2 (male vs. female) ANOVA.   
 Significant main effects emerged for religious fundamentalism on the 
peacefulness ratings F (1, 54) = 8.92, p = .004, the positive affect ratings F (1, 55) = 
11.14, p = .002, and on the uncertainty ratings F (1, 55) = 65.24, p < .0001.  High 
religious fundamentalists essays were more peaceful (M = 29.58), contained more 
positive affect (M = 28.67), and less uncertainty (M = 9.11) than low religious 
fundamentalists (whose Ms for peacefulness, positive affect, and uncertainty were 22.96, 
20.61 and 26.71, respectively). 
 There was a main effect of sex on the sadness ratings of the essays F (1, 55) = 
4.16, p = .047, with womens essays conveying more sadness (M = 21.8) than mens 
essays (M = 19.64). 
 The analysis of overall negative affect revealed a significant interaction between 
religious fundamentalism and sex F (1, 55) = 4.39, p = .041.  T-tests showed that the high 
and low religious fundamentalist men showed similar levels of negative affect, (Ms for 
high and low RFs were 20.63 and 19.92, respectively), t (18) = -.16, p = .88 (two-tailed).  
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However, low religious fundamentalist women showed a far greater amount of sadness in 
their essays (M = 27.88) than high religious fundamentalist women (M = 17.42), t (33) = 
3.43, p = .002 (two-tailed).   
 Overall, the patterns of results from the essay ratings suggest that thoughts of 
death lead high religious fundamentalists to think about their religion, and that these 
thoughts of death are less disturbing than those of their low religious fundamentalist 
counterparts.  Indeed, the existential dilemma which is seemingly engendered by the 
traditional mortality salience manipulation does not seem to affect high religious 
fundamentalists, who respond to the MS treatment with feelings of peacefulness, 
happiness, and certainty.  Perhaps, for such people, their worldview provides them with 
such protection against mortality concerns, that there is no such thing as an existential 
dilemma for them. 
 These analyses suggest an interesting possibility:  that the observed levels of 
peacefulness, positive affect, and uncertainty displayed in the essays mediated the 
attenuated bias for the high religious fundamentalist participants.  To assess this prospect, 
I computed correlations between all of the nine different dimensions of essay codings and 
the person and opinion bias scores.  None of the essay codings were correlated with either 
bias score, suggesting that these variables did not mediate the relationship between 
religious fundamentalism and worldview defense. 
Analysis of the Religious Fundamentalism Measure 
 Finally, as the religious fundamentalism measure is at the heart of all these 
analyses, I thought it prudent to verify that scores on this measure were not influenced by 
the experimental manipulation.  Although the religious fundamentalism scale was 
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administered after the death or dental salience manipulation, the amount of time lapsed 
between this manipulation and the scale was at least 10 minutes (we timed the length of 
our distracter tasks to take at least this long).  Also, all participants had a chance to 
defend their worldviews.  Research has shown that after participants defend their 
worldviews, the effects of mortality salience are completely eliminated (Greenberg, 
Arndt, Schimel, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 2001).  These two facts made it unlikely, in 
my opinion, that the religious fundamentalism measure would be in any way affected by 
the experimental manipulation. 
 The one-way ANOVA revealed no significant effects of mortality salience F (1, 
119) = .07, p = .79 on the religious fundamentalism measure.  Thus, the data do not 
indicate that the religious fundamentalism measure was compromised by the 
experimental manipulation. 
Discussion 
 The main hypothesis of this study, that high religious fundamentalists would show 
no more pro-worldview bias after mortality salience than after dental pain salience, was 
supported.   
 For the person evaluation, there was a general trend for low religious 
fundamentalists to show more pro-worldview bias after MS than after the control 
manipulation, and for high religious fundamentalist participants to show no difference in 
either the death or dental pain conditions.  For the male participants person evaluations, 
my hypothesis was supported; male low religious fundamentalist participants showed 
significantly greater person bias after MS than after the control treatment, while male 
high religious fundamentalist participants did not. 
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 For the essay evaluation, low religious fundamentalist participants showed 
significantly more pro-worldview bias after the MS treatment than after the control 
treatment.  However, high religious fundamentalist participants showed no greater bias 
after MS treatment than after the control treatment.  It seems that, in this study, the high 
religious fundamentalist participants were immune to the typical effects of the mortality 
salience induction. 
 It is worth noting again that low religious fundamentalists held relatively 
unfavorable views towards upholding all A&M traditions in the dental pain condition, but 
that the valence of this view was reversed in the MS condition.  After thinking about their 
own death, low religious fundamentalist participants evidenced favorable opinions about 
upholding all A&M traditions. 
 Moreover, though the high religious fundamentalists had greater positive affect 
overall, this variable did not mediate the relationship between religious fundamentalism 
and worldview bias. 
 Coding of the death essays revealed that high religious fundamentalists essays 
were more peaceful, contained more positive affect, and less uncertainty than the low 
religious fundamentalists essays.  
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 All in all, the results from these two studies suggest some interesting additions 
and revisions to terror management theory. 
 The results of the first study are somewhat in contradiction of standard TMT 
theorizing.  Specifically, self-construal was shown to protect against mortality concerns, 
irrespective of self-esteem, and irrespective of the delineation of a specific ingroup for 
participants to identify with. 
 The results of this study suggest that terror management effects might be 
attenuated, or that death might be less of a concern to individuals in Eastern countries, 
who have been shown to have chronic interdependent self-construals.  This would seem 
to contradict the basic idea of terror management theory; that death is a universal problem 
with the same consequences everywhere.  Future cross-cultural research might perhaps 
address this intriguing possibility. 
 The results of the second study are more in line with standard terror management 
theorizing.  Pyszczynski, Solomon, and Greenberg (2003) have speculated that 
fundamentalist orientations might help protect individuals from death concerns.  Perhaps 
this is what draws so many people all over the world to religions with fundamentalist 
worldviews.    
 An important, interesting question that remains to be answered is:  are religious 
fundamentalists completely immune to terror management effects under all conditions?  
In this study, we found that, when writing about their own death, high religious 
fundamentalists wrote more peaceful, positive, and assured essays.  Perhaps, for these 
participants, this task essentially bolstered their cultural worldview.  Thus, when 
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presented with the essays, high religious fundamentalists had already eliminated the 
effects of the mortality salience manipulation, and so they felt no need to bolster their 
cultural worldview. 
 However, if one were to get high religious fundamentalist participants to think 
about death, without giving them the opportunity to defend their worldviews, would they 
then show typical terror management effects?  Such an investigation would provide 
insight into the extent to which religious fundamentalism provides protection from 
mortality concerns, and this is the next direction that I will take in following up this 
research. 
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